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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the association between information disclosure violation (IDV) and firm value, based on a sample of 
Chinese listed firms that were subject to China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) enforcement actions from 
2000 to 2014. Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value at the end of the enforcement action year, we find that firm 
value in violating firms is significantly lower than firm value in non-violating firms. Further, we find IDV with the 
following characteristics can cause serious damage to firm value: IDV related to inflated profit or asset fabrication 
have a more damaging effect on firm value; the total number of violation types, fines and the total number of 
admonishment types are negatively associated with firm value; violation frequency and number of years between 
violations and CSRC enforcement action are negatively related to firm value. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
hina is the second largest economy in the world, with astonishingly rapid growth admired by other 
countries. However, it is frequently noted that many listed firms are punished for failing to disclose 
information as required. For example, Yunnan Green-Land Biological Technology Co., Ltd (Code: 
002200) is suspected of inflating profit and asset fabrication. Yunnan Green-Land revised its profit forecast 
frequently, changing estimated income for 2009 from ￥62 million on Feb 27, 2010, to￥-151 million on April 30, 
2010.  
 
Corporate transparency, honesty, governance, and monitoring and regulation of listed firms are major concerns for 
Chinese investors (Anderson, 2000). 
 
A great nation with lots of fraud, violations, or irregularity issues in its capital markets may be doomed to eventual 
failure, no matter how fast it is developing. The Toshiba financial scandal of 2015, an example of channel stuffing, 
is notable. The tremendously important issue of egregious firm violations makes many investors, capital market 
regulators, and researchers realize the importance of IDV. 
 
Adverse market reaction to IDV or China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) enforcement action has been 
documented extensively in the literature (e.g., Smith et al., 1984; Feroz et al., 1991; Ferris et al., 1992; Chen et al., 
2005; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Muradoglu and Huskey, 2008). However, these researchers are more concerned with 
the economic consequences of IDV from a short-run perspective, neglecting the potential long-run damaging 
consequences from IDV, which may be incorporated or assimilated into the market. A stock price reaction can result 
from changes in expectations of future cash flows or changes in the discount rate, or both. Thus, studying the 
consequences of IDV can bring about more robust understanding of such reactions. 
 
In the Chinese capital markets, types of IDV include inflated profit, asset fabrication, fines by regulatory authorities 
and others. It is difficult to distinguish these violations from opportunistic behavior or daily mistakes. Also, many 
listed firms are marked with several types of violation, and have multiple violations, as well as long time span (the 
period from when a firm commits a violation to the announcement date on which the CSRC publishes an 
enforcement action). Regulators seek to improve efficiency in capital markets (Healey and Palepu, 2001) and level 
the playing field through mandatory disclosure (Zhu and Gippel, 2015). Further, regulatory agencies such as the 
C 
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CSRC may pursue alternative measures (e.g., public criticism, public condemnation, warnings, and fines) to punish 
culprit firms according to violation type and severity. However, these latter violation measures have not been fully 
explored in the literature (Chen et al., 2005) 
 
This paper examines the impacts of IDV on firm value; specifically, it tests whether firm value is lower in violating 
firms than in non-violating firms. It also examines whether firm value varies with violation characteristics, such as 
violation types like inflated profit, categories of types (such as inflated profit, asset fabrication, false statement and 
others), fines by regulatory institutions (CSRC, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange), type of 
enforcement (public criticism, public condemnation, warning, fine), violation frequency, and violation time span. 
We restrict our sample to first-time violation disclosures, as these should be more consequential for insider trading 
and stock return than subsequent violations, as reported by Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995), Dichev and Skinner 
(2002), Demiroglu and James (2010), and Griffin et al. (2014). 
 
As described below in H5, the adverse economic consequences brought about by IDV are not temporary; they are 
quite long-lasting. However, many listed firms may underestimate this long-term potential hazard; their 
managements may regard violations as less serious, leading to frequent violations. Against this background, it seems 
appropriate to study now the economic consequences of IDV from a long-run perspective. 
 
Overall, testing the impact of IDV on firm value in the Chinese capital markets holds several important implications. 
First, it allows us to test whether IDV negatively affects firm value in emerging markets. To date, the impact of IDV 
on firm value has not been sufficiently studied. Development of Chinese Standard Inspective Procedure (SIP) is still 
in progress, leading to firm value calculation that differs from that of the US. Further, different shareholder classes 
in China have distinct incentives and abilities to monitor management; large shareholders in particular have absolute 
controlling power through their non-tradable shares.1 Large shareholders themselves may give instructions to or 
exert political influence over management, who may hold critical information or carry out entrenchment actions 
through information asymmetry, so the adverse effect of IDV may infringe only upon minority shareholders. In 
addition, political considerations always dominate, shadowing irregularities in culprit firms (Anderson, 2000). These 
considerations make Chinese IDV divergent from other countries’ settings. Therefore, by examining the impact of 
IDV in the Chinese context, we can extend and complement the literature on information disclosure. 
 
Second, research on the effect of IDV on firm value takes mainly a short-run perspective, around announcement of 
enforcement action by the CSRC. Chen et al. (2005), Heflin and Hsu (2008), Muradoglu and Clark (2008), and 
Murphy et al. (2009) document a downward earnings expectation for investors after IDV disclosure. These 
researchers neglect the long-term effect, which may be incorporated or assimilated into the market. Stock price 
reaction can result from changes in expectations of future cash flows or changes in the discount rate, or both; thus, 
we examine firm value at the end of the enforcement year, which may provide a much more advantageous tool to 
examine the effect of IDV from a steadier perspective. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to relate 
IDV to firm value in the long run. 
 
Third, we examine the relationship between firm value and violation characteristics, such as violation type (e.g., 
inflated profit, total number of violation types, types of admonishment (e.g., fines), violation frequency, and 
violation time span). Our research extends and complements the theory of IDV, providing input into future policy 
deliberations by regulators. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant literature and sets forth our empirical 
predictions. Section 3 describes our sample and research design. Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical results and 
additional analyses, respectively, and Section 6 details our conclusions. 
 
  
                                                
1 Non-tradable shares can be bought and sold only through private placement with special approval from the government. The non-tradable 
restriction is to uphold the fundamental doctrine of socialism that all economic means belong to the people so that “no person is allowed to sell 
out socialism.” 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Effects of IDV on Capital Markets 
 
The effects of IDV have not been studied extensively, even in developed markets. Smith et al. (1984), Feroz et al. 
(1991), Howe and Schlarbaum (1986), and Nourayi (1994, 1995) examine Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) enforcement actions and confirm a small negative market reaction upon disclosure of violations. Karpoff et 
al. (2008) find that firms lose 41% of their market value when news of misconduct is revealed. Murphy et al. (2009) 
find that decreases in earnings and increases in risk accompany allegations of misconduct between January 1982 and 
December 1996. Further, some researchers study IDV from a legal perspective. Using 269 events between 1995 and 
2004, Muradoglu and Clark (2008) examine the effect of announcement of SEC legal enforcement actions, finding 
that SEC lawsuits have a negative effect on share price. Their results also show that the markets are able to 
differentiate between minor and major violations, and cases related to fraud and insider trading, which lead to more 
damaging consequences than procedural violations and improper accounting. However, these studies focus 
exclusively on IDV in mature markets, neglecting the distinct mechanisms inherent in diverse systems and 
institutions all over the world. 
 
Regulation in China stems from the CSRC. The CSRC is the sole supervisor of the financial markets and public 
firms in China; it initiates investigations based on a number of leads. These leads include complaints from investors, 
information from insiders or former employees of firms, the media, and analyses of annual reports and other 
corporate disclosures, along with referrals from stock exchanges, legal disputes, and police investigations (Chen et 
al., 2005). CSRC investigations lead to sanctions and enforcement action (similar to Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases in the US) reports when firms or their managements are found to be involved in fraud or other 
irregularities. 
 
Also, Chinese share issue privatization has created different classes of shares, namely state, institutional, foreign, 
insider, individual, and employee shares. These shareholders differ in their interests in the firm and their incentives 
and ability to monitor management (Wei et al., 2005). Further, in China’s economic transition, literally all listed 
firms were carved out of state-owned enterprises (Yao et al., 2010), and numerous shares of many public firms are 
owned by the state and its associated ministries (Chen et al., 2005). Such large shareholders have absolute 
controlling power via their non-tradable shares. Corporate governance in China is still developing and can be 
characterized as weak shareholder protection and underdeveloped markets for corporate control (LaPorta et al., 
1999). Reducing information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors is an important issue for 
investors and regulators. Many studies find that disclosure of information decreases information asymmetry 
(Chiyachantana et al., 2004; Eleswarapu et al., 2004; Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Shroff et al., 2013). There is 
evidence that shareholders with better access to analyst recommendations earn significant abnormal returns from 
trading on such information (Lepone et al., 2013; Zhu and Gippel, 2015). 
 
Managerial ownership in China is minimal and insiders can gain control either through direct government 
appointments or indirect political influence. IDV may be directed by large shareholders themselves (by giving 
instructions to or exercising political influence over management, directly or indirectly), so the adverse effect of 
IDV may infringe only upon minority shareholders. Further, given that China is still a fundamentally socialist 
country ruled by the Communist Party, political considerations always dominate, shadowing irregularities in suspect 
firms. This means that when IDVs are exposed publicly, government intervention may help violating firms 
understate their mistakes. These factors make Chinese IDV divergent from other settings. 
 
Adverse Effects from IDV 
 
Negative and adverse effects from IDV may be harmful to firm development in the long run (Karpoff et al., 2008). 
However, most research on the consequences of IDV are from a short-run perspective, neglecting potential 
dangerous consequences in the long run, which ought to keep culprits from offending to some extent. To fill this 
void and to have managements understand the severity and harm of IDV to firm development, this paper examines 
the impact of IDV on firm value based on the Chinese capital market. Therefore, we expect that firm value is 
negatively affected by IDV, and we state our first hypothesis as follows: 
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H1: Firm value in violating firms is substantially lower than firm value in non-violating firms. 
 
Relationship Between Violation Characteristics and Firm Value Among IDV Companies 
 
Chen et al. (2005) research IDV under investigations of the CSRC in the Chinese capital markets in the period 1999 
to 2003. These authors find that enforcement actions by the CSRC have a negative impact on stock prices, with most 
firms suffering wealth losses of around 1% to 2% in the five days following the event. Further, they divide samples 
by type of enforcement (public criticism, public condemnation, warning, and fine), by regulatory institution (CSRC, 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange), and by type of violation (illegal share buyback, inflated 
profit, asset fabrication, unauthorized fund use change, postponement/delay in disclosure, false statement, fund 
provision violation, major failure to disclose information, major shareholder embezzlement, and others). They find 
that public condemnations and warnings attract more severe price reactions than do the most serious sanctions 
(fines), and only major failure to disclose information has a negative impact on stock returns. Regrettably, Chen et 
al. (2005) fail to fully explore the reasons for the effect on stock return by violation characteristics. 
 
First, we analyze the relationship between violation types and firm value. Inflated profit and asset fabrication are 
experienced by most companies. Inflated profit and asset fabrication directly relate to financial statement 
manipulation by management, which can decrease management integrity sharply, causing investors to divert their 
resources. Also, Feroz et al. (1991) find that revenue recognition and overstatement of current assets draw the most 
SEC attention.  
 
H2a: Decreasing firm value caused by IDV is more pronounced for IDV firms with inflated profits or asset 
fabrication case than for IDV firms with other violation types. 
 
The more violation types firms experience, the lower their firm value. Thus, we set forth the following hypothesis. 
 
H2b: IDV firm value is negatively related to the total number of violation types. 
 
Second, we analyze the relationship between admonishment type and firm value. CSRC enforcement actions include 
public criticism, public condemnation, official warning, and monetary fines. The first two are the mildest forms of 
admonishment, followed by official warning and then fine (Chen et al., 2005). Fine is the most common 
admonishment type used by the CSRC. Therefore, we present the following hypotheses: 
 
H3a: Decreasing firm value caused by IDV is more pronounced for IDV firms being fined than for IDV firms with 
other admonishment types. 
 
H3b: Firm value of IDV companies is negatively related to the total number of admonishment types. 
 
Third, we analyze the relationship between violation frequency and firm value. Firms with multiple violations are an 
indication that there are material deficiencies in internal control and that management integrity cannot be relied 
upon, which may bring more damage to firm value. Therefore, we present the following hypotheses: 
 
H4: Firm value of IDV companies is negatively related to violation frequency. 
 
Finally, we consider the long-term effect of violation. The presence of detected violations at earlier times suggests 
that prior financial statement or material business transactions are not entirely correct, and the later the violation is 
exposed, the more periods are influenced, and the more investors are deceived. Thus, we present the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H5: Firm value of IDV companies is negatively related to time span from the year of violation to the year of 
exposure. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between IDV and firm value. 
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Figure 1. Framework for Relationship between IDV and Firm Value 
 
 
 
 
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We examine the impact of IDV on firm value in listed firms. We then examine whether some violation types have 
more severe consequences than others. We also develop a pooled cross-sectional model to explain our research. 
 
Sample 
 
We first match the CSMAR database2 and IDV sample based on stock code and IDV year. Connecting these two 
elements allows us to identify the basic characteristics of IDV firms, including industry, size, financial ratio, and 
ownership structure. We require that each observation have valid data from the CSMAR database. Further, we 
ensure that these non-violating observations have no IDV cases during the period chosen. To achieve comparability 
among all firms, we focus only on the A-share market, excluding the B-share market. This is because B-share firms 
differ from A-share firms in many respects, such as listing and delisting conditions, disclosure requirements. 
Merging the CSMAR database and the IDV sample results in a sample of 1,623 identified observations of IDV 
relative to 14,343 non-restatement observations of public companies. 
 
Methodology 
 
We empirically investigate the impact of IDV on the capital markets. We take IDV exposure year as our baseline 
research year and establish whether firm value is significantly lower in violating firms than in non-violating firms. 
To test our hypotheses, we take Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value at year-end. Following Wei et al. (2005), our 
primary valuation measure, Tobin's Q (TOBINQ), is computed as the sum of market value of equity and book value 
of debt, divided by book value of assets.3 We winsorize TOBINQ at the 5th and 95th percentiles to alleviate the 
influences of extreme outliers. 
 
To test our hypotheses, we use two ordinary least square regression models. While Model (1) investigates the 
association between IDV and firm value for H1, Model (2) tests the relationship between violation characteristics 
and firm value among IDV firms for H2–H5. 
 
TOBINQ=β1IDV+β2ROA+β3GROW+β4LEV+β5LNA+β6AO+β7BIG4+β8HI+β9SS+β10TS 
+β11DUAL+β12BSIZE+β13OSIZE+ΣIND+ΣYEAR+ε (1) 
 
TOBINQ=β1VIC+β2ROA+β3GROW+β4LEV+β5LNA+β6AO+β7BIG4+β8HI+β9SS+β10TS 
+β11DUAL+β12BSIZE+β13OSIZE+ΣIND+ΣYEAR+ε (2) 
 
The dependent variable for Model (1), IDV, is classified as either experiencing an IDV (=1) or non-experiencing 
                                                
2 This database is commercially available at Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company Ltd. Also, firm value data and other data are 
collected from the CSMAR database, including Tobin’s Q and other market valuation indicators, financial ratios, corporate governance data and 
other data in connection with Chinese listed firms.  
3 Here, market value of equity of non-tradable shares is substituted by net assets. 
Information Disclosure Violation (IDV) Characteristics:  
Violation Types: H2a, H2b 
Admonishment Types: H3a, H3b 
Violation Frequency: H4 
Long Term Effect of Violation: H5 
Information Disclosure Violation (IDV): H1 
 
Firm Value 
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(=0). The dependent variable for Model (2), VIC, refers to violation characteristics, which includes inflated profit or 
asset fabrication (IPAF), total number of violation types (TNT), fines (FINE), total number of admonishment types 
(NAT), violation frequency (VF), and year span between violation and exposure (YSPAN). The IPAF variable is an 
indicator for whether the firm relates inflated profits or asset fabrication. The TNT variable is the total number of 
types of IDV. The FINE variable equals 1 if the firm relates to the admonishment type, that is, fine, zero otherwise. 
The NAT variable is the total number of admonishment types. The VF variable is the frequency of violation. The 
YSPAN variable is the time span between violation year and exposure year. 
 
To control for the effect of profitability and growth, we use ROA and GROW. ROA is measured as earnings divided 
by equity, and GROW is asset growth before the IDV exposure year. We control for firm leverage, represented by 
LEV, measured as liabilities divided by assets. Ceteris paribus, higher leverage is related to higher risk, which may 
affect firm value. LNA is natural logarithm of total assets, which controls for firm size. To control for the effect of 
external audit, we use AO and BIG4. AO is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is issued an unqualified 
auditor opinion, zero otherwise. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by “Big4” auditors, 
zero otherwise. Prior studies such as Wei et al. (2005) document that TOBINQ is affected by ownership 
concentration in China, so we include HI, a Herfindahl index, as a proxy for ownership concentration. Further, state 
share (SS) is considered, depicting ownership of state-owned enterprise. SS is measured by percentage ownership by 
the state; otherwise SS equals zero. Trading share (TS) is also considered, represented by TS, depicting tradable 
shares. TS is an indicator variable that equals 1 after the year end of 2005, when Equity Division Reform began to be 
enforced by the SEC. Thus, TS equals zero before 2005. DUAL is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO 
takes the role of chairman of the board, zero otherwise. BSIZE and OSIZE represent board size and supervisory size, 
respectively. Finally, industry and year differences are included in regressions. All variables used in this paper are 
defined in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Variables and Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
TOBINQ The sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, divided by book value of assets 
Independent Variables 
IDV An indicator variable that equals one when the firm relates to information disclosure violation, and zero otherwise 
IPAF An indicator variable that equals one when the firm relates to inflated profits or asset fabrication, and zero otherwise 
TNT The total number of types of IDV which the firm is experienced 
FINE An indicator variable that equals one when the firm relates to the admonishment type which is fine, and zero otherwise 
NAT The total number of admonishment types experienced by the firm 
VF Violation frequency between violation year and exposure year 
YSPAN Timespan between violation year and exposure year 
Control Variables 
ROA Earnings divided by equity，to control for the effect of profitability and growth 
GROW Asset growth before IDV exposure year，to control for the effect of growth 
LEV Liabilities divided by assets, to control for firm leverage 
LAN Natural logarithm of total assets, to control for firm size 
AO An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is issued an unqualified auditor opinion, zero otherwise 
BIG4 An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is audited by “Big4” auditor, zero otherwise 
HI Herfindahl index, as a proxy for ownership concentration 
SS State ownership in percent if under state control, zero otherwise, if it is not controlled by state 
TS An indicator variable that equals one after 2005, zero otherwise 
DUAL An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO takes the role of chairman of the board, zero otherwise 
BSIZE Board size 
OSIZE Supervisory board size 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 details the distribution of our IDV sample by year and initiator. It is apparent that IDVs are investigated and 
exposed mainly by the CSRC and the two major exchanges. Further, it is evident that IDV exposure increases after 
2001, increasing rapidly from 2012, and peaking in 2013 and 2014. Additionally, it is evident from Table 2 that 
IDVs are also exposed by other supervisors from 2006. The number of IDV samples exposed by “other” supervisors 
increased to 83 in 2013; this number increased in 2014 to 96. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the IDV Sample by Year and Initiator* 
Year CSRC1 (%) Shanghai Exchange (%) 
Shenzhen 
Exchange (%) 
Ministry of 
Finance2 (%) Other
3 (%) Total (%) 
2000 3 2 2 0 0 7 (0.43) 
2001 12 18 17 0 0 47 (2.90) 
2002 8 19 15 1 0 43 (2.65) 
2003 8 15 14 0 0 37 (2.28) 
2004 4 17 17 0 0 38 (2.34) 
2005 36 12 23 0 0 71 (4.37) 
2006 27 10 22 1 1 61 (3.76) 
2007 26 10 14 3 4 57 (3.51) 
2008 14 7 26 2 11 60 (3.70) 
2009 37 4 37 1 34 113 (6.96) 
2010 43 10 54 1 37 145 (8.93) 
2011 46 2 68 4 53 173 (10.66) 
2012 62 7 81 0 78 228 (14.05) 
2013 69 16 86 4 83 258 (15.90) 
2014 83 27 77 2 96 285 (17.56) 
Total 478 (29.45) 176 (10.84) 553 (34.07) 19 (1.18) 397 (24.46) 1623 (100) 
Notes: * The numbers in parentheses in the right column of Table 2 refer to the percentage of IDV samples of each year in the total number 
(1623); Bottom numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of IDV samples found by different initiators in the total number (1623). 
1 “CSRC” also includes the Resident Office of China Securities Regulatory Commission in every province of China. 
2 “Ministry of Finance” includes the Resident Office (TePaiBan) in every province in China. 
3 “Other” includes: National Environmental Protection Bureau, Bureau of Industry and Information Technology; local securities regulatory 
bureaus, such as the Beijing Securities Regulatory Bureau, the Shenzhen Securities Regulatory Bureau, Fujian Securities Regulatory Bureau; the 
Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau, the departments of environmental protection of every province of China. 
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the violating and non-violating firms. The mean TOBINQ is 1.439 for the 
IDV group, lower than the 1.457 for the non-violating group, showing that firm value may be adversely affected by 
IDV. Further, violating firms have higher profitability, slower growth, and higher leverage, greater likelihood of 
being issued an unqualified auditor opinion, smaller ownership concentration, higher state ownership, and lower 
percentage of tradable shares. 
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Table 3. Characteristics of IDV and Non-violating Sample 
Variable IDV Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Difference 
TOBINQ 0 1.457 0.503 0.898 2.641 0.018
*** 
1 1.439 0.480 0.898 2.641 (3.58) 
ROA 0 0.033 0.036 -0.103 0.117 0.041
*** 
1 -0.008 0.069 -0.009 0.567 (20.49) 
GROW 0 0.690 1.179 -0.399 3.072 -0.062
*** 
1 0.752 1.243 -0.293 4.656 (-8.73) 
LEV 0 0.485 0.178 0.170 0.837 -0.118
*** 
1 0.603 0.206 0.170 0.837 (-15.89) 
LNA 0 1.478 1.236 0.314 3.098 0.796
*** 
1 2.682 1.431 0.005 2.653 (15.42) 
AO 0 0.796 0.403 0 1 -0.127
*** 
1 0.923 0.266 0 1 (-5.86) 
BIG4 0 0.050 0.219 0 1 0.002 1 0.048 0.213 0 1 (0.15) 
HI 0 19.288 13.779 2.554 28.494 5.474
*** 
1 13.814 11.470 2.554 36.945 (9.75) 
SS 0 0.247 0.241 0 0.750 -0.055
*** 
1 0.302 0.255 0 0.810 (-3.50) 
TS 0 0.456 0.147 0 1 0.0170
* 
1 0.438 0.153 0 1 (1.78) 
DUAL 0 0.859 0.349 0 1 -0.032 1 0.891 0.312 0 1 (-1.54) 
BSIZE 0 9.292 2.427 4 19 -0.018 1 9.311 2.137 4 19 (-0.13) 
OSIZE 0 3.996 1.292 1 9 -0.087 1 4.083 1.315 2 10 (-1.05) 
Violating group is represented by IDV=1; non-violating group is represented by IDV=0. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Correlation Analysis 
 
Before carrying out the regressions, univariate correlation analysis is performed to examine whether there exist 
higher correlations between variables. Table 4 presents Pearson correlations for all samples in Panel A and only IDV 
samples in Panel B, respectively. In Panel A, correlations between LNA and BIG4 (0.379), HI and SS (0.564), HI 
and TS (-0.470), HI and DUAL (-0.062), SS and TS (-0.491), LNA and BSIZE (0.326), OSIZE and BSIZE (0.369), 
YEAR and TS (0.536), and YEAR and IND (0.697), are slightly higher; other correlations between variables are not 
material. In Panel B, high correlation is indeed a serious problem between some variables, for example, TNT and 
FINE (0.345), and YSPAN and VF (0.735). These high correlations are quite apparent by their nature. Thus, we 
decide against putting all these IDV characteristics variables in one regression. Further, to ensure the result is 
correct, we carry out a multicollinearity test, finding that all Variance Inflation Factors are less than 10. Hence, 
multicollinearity is not an important issue in this study. 
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Table 4. Univariate Correlations4 
Panel A. Correlations for Violating and Non-violating Samples (N=15,966) 
Variable TOBINQ IDV ROA GROW LEV LNA AO BIG4 
TOBINQ 1        
IDV -0.088*** 1       
ROA 0.026** 0.040*** 1      
GROW -0.037*** -0.088*** -0.027*** 1     
LEV 0.051*** 0.019* 0.072*** -0.027*** 1    
LNA -0.332*** -0.154*** -0.079*** 0.189*** -0.111*** 1   
AO -0.100*** -0.291*** -0.032*** 0.096*** -0.074*** 0.206*** 1  
BIG4 -0.120*** -0.057*** -0.003 0.028*** -0.006 0.379*** 0.055*** 1 
HI -0.182*** -0.097*** -0.011 0.054*** -0.016 0.166*** 0.062*** 0.087*** 
SS -0.264*** -0.094*** -0.012 0.035*** -0.015 0.147*** 0.050*** 0.064*** 
TS 0.341*** 0.017* -0.011 -0.053*** 0.003 0.103*** 0.049*** -0.023** 
DUAL 0.079*** 0.032*** -0.006 -0.009 0.029*** -0.087*** -0.045*** -0.033*** 
BSIZE -0.135*** -0.060*** -0.021** 0.044*** -0.013 0.326*** 0.054*** 0.159*** 
OSIZE -0.108*** -0.052*** -0.008 0.018* -0.015 0.251*** 0.038*** 0.097*** 
IND -0.090*** 0.025** 0.009 -0.018** 0.014 0.142*** 0.094*** 0.081*** 
YEAR 0.159*** 0.044*** 0.010 -0.010 0.011 0.200*** 0.103*** 0.040*** 
 
Panal A continued 
Variable HI SS TS DUAL BSIZE OSIZE IND YEAR 
HI 1        
SS 0.564*** 1       
TS -0.470*** -0.491*** 1      
DUAL -0.062*** -0.099*** 0.016 1     
BSIZE 0.001 0.117*** -0.038*** -0.059*** 1    
OSIZE 0.061*** 0.195*** -0.055*** -0.064*** 0.369*** 1   
IND -0.136*** -0.154*** 0.258*** 0.004 -0.069*** -0.082*** 1  
YEAR -0.217*** -0.297*** 0.536*** 0.028*** -0.041*** -0.082*** 0.697*** 1 
 
Panel B. Correlations for IDV Sample (N=1623) 
Variable TOBINQ IPAF TNT FINE NAT VF YSPAN 
TOBINQ 1       
IPAF -0.035** 1      
TNT -0.078** 0.245** 1     
FINE -0.257*** 0.569*** 0.345*** 1    
NAT -0.077** 0.537** 0.146** 0.383*** 1   
VF -0.046** 0.382** 0.534** 0.732*** 0.343** 1  
YSPAN -0.090*** 0.412*** 0.463*** 0.456*** 0.435*** 0.735*** 1 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Regression 
 
Table 5 provides results of equation (1) from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of firm value at IDV 
variables and control variables for IDV and non-violating groups. In Table 5, the dependent variable is TOBINQ. 
Column (1) analyzes how IDV affects firm value. As expected, we find a significantly negative estimated coefficient 
of IDV at the 1% level, which indicates that firm value in IDV firms is much lower than firm value in non-violating 
firms. Column (2) of Table 5 shows the results after controlling for firm characteristics. The negative effect of IDV 
on firm value continues to be statistically significant. For firm characteristics, we detect, surprisingly, a significantly 
negative effect of AO and BIG4 on TOBINQ, which may be due to the fact that auditor industry has not been fully 
accepted by capital markets in China. After controlling for industry and year difference in Column (3), we find 
similar results. Thus, H1 is supported, which means that means firm value in violating firms is much lower than firm 
value in non-violating firms. 
                                                
4 For reasons of limited space, industry variables are untablated; they have no high correlations with other variables. Control variables are not 
tabulated in Panel B, for space considerations, which do not have high correlations with IDV characteristics variables. 
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Table 5. OLS Regression Results for All Samples 
Dependent variable is TOBINQ 
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) 
constant  1.729
*** 2.236*** 5.046*** 
(12.92) (43.61) (28.85) 
IDV - -0.218
*** -0.106*** -0.068*** 
(-8.78) (-4.49) (-4.95) 
ROA (%)5 +  2.911
*** 0.020*** 
 (24.86) (4.11) 
GROW (%) -  -0.002
* -0.001 
 (-0.30) (-0.07) 
LEV +  0.069
*** 0.066*** 
 (16.17) (16.44) 
LNA -  -0.159
*** -0.191 
 (-30.11) (-33.84) 
AO +  -0.450
*** -0.171*** 
 (-8.76) (-8.08) 
BIG4 +  -0.010 -0.001  (-0.48) (-0.05) 
HI -  -0.671
*** -0.502*** 
 (-6.74) (-5.24) 
SS -  -0.473
*** -0.358*** 
 (-18.00) (-13.52) 
TS +  0.001
*** 0.0001*** 
 (8.06) (5.99) 
DUAL +  0.045
** 0.040** 
 (2.75) (2.55) 
BSIZE -  -0.006
* -0.005* 
 (-2.12) (-1.79) 
OSIZE -  -0.008
* -0.011** 
 (-2.07) (-2.65) 
IND    Controlled 
YEAR    Controlled 
Observations  15966 15966 15966 
F-value  77.01 84.18 82.92 
Adj. R2  0.076 0.078 0.192 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Table 6 shows the results of equation (2) from OLS regression of firm value at violation characteristics and control 
variables for IDV groups, to test H2 to H5. Further, the dependent variable is TOBINQ. Column (1) analyzes the 
relationship between IPAF and TOBINQ; the results show that decreasing firm value caused by IDV is more 
pronounced for firms with inflated profit or asset fabrication than for firms with other violation types. Thus, H2a is 
supported. Column (2) of Table 6 shows the significantly negative results for variable TNT, which means that firm 
value is negatively related to the total number of violation types. Thus, H2b is supported. 
 
Column (3) shows the significantly negative relationship between FINE and TOBINQ; thus this relationship support 
H3a. Column (4) analyzes how admonishment types affect firm value. Thus, H3b is supported. That is, firm value is 
negatively related to the total number of admonishment types. 
 
Column (5) shows the significantly negative relationship between violations frequency and TOBINQ, thus 
supporting H4: firm value of IDV companies is negatively related to violation times. Thus, H4 is supported. 
 
                                                
5 Due to smaller coefficients of ROA and GROW, the original is multiplied by 100. The same method is used in Table 7. The coefficient of ROA 
is negative because two observations of ROA are extreme outliers, influencing the expected sign. After we drop these two observations, the sign 
of ROA is significantly positive without influencing other coefficients’ sign. 
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Column (6) analyzes how firm value is negatively related to year span between a violation and its exposure. Thus, 
H5 is supported, that is, firm value is negatively related to year span between a violation and its exposure. 
To sum up, all hypotheses are supported. Therefore, IDV can bring about serious damage to firm value. 
 
Table 6. OLS Regression Results in IDV Group 
Dependent variable is TOBINQ 
Variable Sign (1) H2a (2) H2b (3) H3a (4) H3b (5) H4 (6) H5 
constant  11.967
** 13.399*** 14.979*** 12.243*** 13.256*** 14.103*** 
 (2.26) (3.61) (3.85) (3.47) (3.05) (3.23) 
IPAF - -0.227
**      
(-2.25)      
TNT -  -0.035
***     
 (-2.96)     
FINE -   -0.034
***    
  (-3.15)    
NAT -    -0.012
***   
   (-5.18)   
VF -     -0.039
**  
    (-2.27)  
YSPAN -      -0.004
** 
     (-2.15) 
Observations  1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 
F-value  15.68 15.22 15.12 15.18 15.44 15.11 
Adj. R2  0.368 0.360 0.359 0.360 0.362 0.358 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
In this section, we substitute several variables in equations (1) and (2), such as substitute return on equity (ROE) for 
TOBINQ. The findings, shown in Table 7, are consistent with the conclusions in Table 5. Thus, it is again shown 
that firm value in violating firms is significantly lower than firm value in non-violating firms. 
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Table 7. OLS Regression Results for All Samples 
Dependent variable is ROE 
ROE Sign (1) (2) (3) 
constant  2.369
*** 4.966*** 4.456*** 
(4.54) (24.61) (34.05) 
IDV - -0.575
*** -2.457*** -1.434*** 
(-5.37) (-5.34) (-4.23) 
ROA (%) +  4.534
*** 1.023*** 
 (3.86) (2.98) 
GROW (%) -  -0.001 -0.002  (-0.04) (-0.05) 
LEV +  0.102
*** 0.065*** 
 (11.19) (14.01) 
LNA -  -0.456
*** -0.345 
 (-23.11) (-13.56) 
AO +  -0.345
*** -0.443*** 
 (-5.66) (-4.54) 
BIG4 +  -0.009 -0.012  (-0.39) (-0.25) 
HI -  -0.561
*** -0.562*** 
 (-6.64) (-5.65) 
SS -  -0.345
*** -0.334*** 
 (-18.89) (-16.62) 
TS +  0.001
*** 0.001*** 
 (8.89) (6.98) 
DUAL +  0.078
*** 0.009*** 
 (3.75) (3.15) 
BSIZE -  -0.009
** -0.002* 
 (-2.66) (-1.79) 
OSIZE -  -0.002
* -0.011** 
 (-2.17) (-2.75) 
IND    controlled 
YEAR    controlled 
Observations  15966 15966 15966 
F-value  67.01 45.78 54.92 
Adj. R2  0.165 0.034 0.534 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
The results in Table 8 below show no significant difference from the results displayed in Table 6. All hypotheses are 
proved. Thus, IDV with violation characteristics (IPAF, TNT, FINE, NAT, VF, YSPAN) can bring about serious 
damage to firm value. 
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Table 8. OLS Regression Results for IDV Group 
Dependent variable is ROE 
Variable Sign (1) H2a (2) H2b (3) H3a (4) H3b (5) H4 (6) H5 
constant  17.457
** 12.342*** 12.834*** 15.463*** 15.576*** 16.457*** 
 (2.56) (3.61) (3.85) (3.47) (3.05) (3.23) 
IPAF - -0.457
***      
(-3.15)      
TNT -  -0.025
***     
 (-3.45)     
FINE -   -0.012
***    
  (-3.23)    
NAT -    -0.034
***   
   (-4.18)   
VF -     -0.034
**  
    (-2.26)  
YSPAN -      -0.003
** 
     (-2.35) 
Observations  1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 
F-value  16.56 15.99 15.56 15.45 15.77 15.14 
Adj. R2  0.456 0.876 0.434 0.356 0.335 0.478 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We identify a sample of 1,623 observations of IDV in the period 2000–2014. These enforcement actions expose 
IDVs committed by firms. In brief, we find that firm value in violating firms is significantly lower than firm value in 
non-violating firms. Further, we find IDV with violation characteristics can bring about serious damage to firm 
value. Specifically, IDV related to inflated profit and asset fabrication have a more damaging effect on firm value; 
fines and other admonishment types, violation frequency and time span between the year of violation and the year of 
CSRC enforcement action are negatively related to firm value. Our findings suggest that some kinds of IDV have 
potentially adverse economic consequences. 
 
The evidence uncovered in this paper holds policy implications for regulators. Our findings that violating firms have 
significantly lower firm value than non-violating firms support the long-term effects of violation. Thus, the CSRC 
should issue severe punishments to violating firms to protect investor interests. This study also holds research 
implications. The findings of this paper indicate that IDV with violation characteristics can bring about serious 
damage to firm value. Thus, securities regulatory bureaus in every province should inspect firms jointly with the 
CSRC to decrease firm violations. Future research should examine the relations between violating firms with 
violating characteristics and stock price from other perspectives. 
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